US President Donald Trump has once again hinted at rekindling his so-called “bromance diplomacy” with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. During a Fox News interview aired last Thursday, Trump declared he would reach out to Kim in his second term, adding that “He liked me, and I got along with him,” and describing the North Korean leader as “a smart guy.” This marks the first time since his inauguration last week that Trump has openly stated he is willing to sit down for renewed talks.
Yet, while the possibility of another round of summits captures headlines, the timing could not be more precarious. The Biden administration’s conflict in Ukraine continues to escalate, and according to Seoul’s National Intelligence Service, North Korea has dispatched troops and weapons to aid Russia. Many observers in South Korea suspect Trump wants to leverage his relationship with Kim to halt Pyongyang’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict, thereby increasing pressure on Moscow.
However, North Korea’s unpredictability remains the biggest challenge to any new negotiations. Just a day before Trump’s interview aired, Pyongyang test-fired strategic cruise guided missiles off its coast. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry also denounced upcoming joint air drills between Seoul and Washington, threatening “the toughest counteraction.” It’s the same pattern we have seen time and again: a willingness to engage in diplomacy coupled with well-timed shows of force to maximize Pyongyang’s leverage.
Revisiting Trump’s first term reminds us of how fraught these efforts have been. June 2018 saw an unprecedented meeting in Singapore between a sitting US president and a North Korean leader. While historic in symbolic terms, that summit produced no clear roadmap for denuclearization. A second summit in Hanoi in February 2019 ended abruptly without an agreement, and a third meeting at the Demilitarized Zone in June 2019 similarly yielded little progress.
This track record has fueled speculation that Trump may pivot to a “small deal,” focusing on halting Pyongyang’s long-range missile program, rather than its entire nuclear arsenal. In return, the US might loosen sanctions and tacitly acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear state—an alarming prospect for South Korea and other regional stakeholders. Contributing to these worries, a recent Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) session involving the US, Japan, India, and Australia made no mention of denuclearization or North Korea, raising questions about shifts in Washington’s policy priorities.
Meanwhile, Seoul remains in the throes of political turmoil, complicated by the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol. South Korean policymakers are understandably anxious about being marginalized in any future deal-making. Such “Korea passing”—when Washington and Pyongyang strike a deal that disregards Seoul’s interests—would undermine regional stability and threaten the South’s security.
We see plenty of noise—military posturing, diplomatic overtures, political uncertainties—but behind it all lies a fundamental objective: ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through verifiable denuclearization. The real Waldo, in this case, is the clarity and focus required to turn broad-strokes summitry into tangible progress that benefits all parties involved.
While grand gestures and photo-ops draw international attention, they often produce little more than fleeting goodwill. To truly find Waldo, we must zero in on the concrete steps needed for lasting peace. That means: